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Abstract—The 5G network takes advantage of the small cells
technology. The next logical step is to cover the urban landscape
with mobile small cells, to optimize network services. However,
the introduction of mobile small cells raises various security
challenges. Cryptographic solutions are capable of solving these
as long as they are supported by appropriate key management
schemes. The threshold-tolerant identity-based cryptosystem
forms a solid basis for key management schemes for mobile small
cells. However, this approach is unable to sustain security over
time. Therefore, we introduce two extensions, proactive secret
sharing and private key cloaking, to address this challenge.
Index Terms—Ad Hoc Network, Beyond 5G, Cryptography,
Decentralized Systems, D2D Communication, Key Management,
Mobile Small Cell, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
The mobile network has seen immense growth over the
last decade, both the number of connected mobile devices
and the amount of mobile data that a mobile device requests
has seen a massive increase. This immense growth does not
seem to slow down as more and more Internet-of-Things (IoT)
devices become available on the global market. The network
infrastructure is limited in its data processing and forwarding
capabilities, even with novel 5G technologies such as the
small cells technology. Many network users have experienced
these limitations during events in which large amounts of data
are simultaneously transmitted, such as New Year’s Eve [1].
The densely populated areas will be the first to notice
network delays. To this end, the EU funded H2020-MSCA
project “SECRET” [2] introduced a networking scenario
which allows for network offloading. In their scenario, an
urban environment is covered by so-called “mobile small
cells”. These are small cells which are entirely made up
of existing mobile devices, connected through device-to-
device (D2D) communication and infrastructureless by nature.
Network users within relative close proximity could rely on
the concept of mobile small cells to communicate instead
of having to rely on the network infrastructure to transmit
all their data. Additional advantages include an increase in
data rates and energy efficiency while reducing latency and
interference.
However, mobile small cells networking raises significant
challenges in terms of security [3]. Cryptographic security
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solutions (e.g., encryption schemes, signature schemes) are
capable of solving these as long as they are supported by a key
management scheme. Generally, key management schemes
rely on some form of a trusted third party (TTP) to provide
security. This TTP is an entity which every user inside the
network believes to be trustworthy and secure against compro-
mise. However, it is assumed that the network infrastructure
and mobile devices from the network users are physically
vulnerable to being compromised and are therefore unable to
act as the TTP to establish security. Security must therefore
be guaranteed by means of a key management scheme which
decentralizes trust.
In this paper, we look into the threshold-tolerant identity-
based cryptosystem [4] as a basis to design a key manage-
ment scheme to secure beyond 5G mobile small cells. This
cryptosystem is unique in the way that it is the only one (to
the authors’ knowledge) which does not rely on an online
TTP during network operation. During network operation, a
threshold number of network users can collectively provide
access to new users. This system therefore decentralizes trust
and does not suffer from a single point of attack from which
the network can be taken down. However, the cryptosystem is
only secure as long as the threshold remains intact. We inves-
tigate whether we can utilize this public key cryptosystem and
design a key management scheme to secure beyond 5G mobile
small cells. This investigation explores two extensions, (i)
proactive secret sharing [5], [6] and (ii) private key cloaking.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
related works. Section III covers some important preliminar-
ies. Section IV covers the two proposed extensions to design
a secure key management scheme based on the threshold-
tolerant identity-based cryptosystem. Section V describes the
planned future work and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
In the last two decades, a variety of key management
schemes have been designed for distributed environments.
Depending on the deployment scenario, a key management
design has its own unique set of requirements. For our de-
ployment scenario, a fully distributed trusted third party (FD-
TTP)-based key management approach has been evaluated to
be the most suitable [3].
The FD-TTP-based key management approach was first
proposed by Luo et al. [7], [8] and is based on the traditional
public key infrastructure (PKI). In traditional PKI, the central-
ized TTP is in possession of a master key pair and uses this
to provide key management services, such as creating signed
certificates for participating network users. In their FD-TTP-
based scheme, the master private key is broken up into pieces
(or shares) using threshold secret sharing techniques [9].
These shares are distributed among the network users, such
that a threshold amount of these can collaboratively provide
the key management service. Deng and Agrawal [10] designed
a FD-TTP-based key management scheme based on identity-
based public key cryptography and Zhang et al. [11] and
de Ree et al. [12] designed FD-TTP-based key management
schemes based on certificateless public key cryptography. To
emphasize, the secret shares in these schemes are merely used
as a tool to establish verifiable keys at network users.
Feldman proposed verifiable secret sharing [13] as an
extension to ordinary threshold secret sharing. Consider the
following scenario: a master secret has been distributed among
a number of users and a threshold amount of these wishes
to reconstruct the master secret. Among their midst is a
dishonest user which discloses a false share instead, making
it impossible for the honest users to reconstruct the master
secret. Furthermore, the honest users are unable to verify
whether the disclosed shares are correct, so there is no way
of knowing which user(s) has been dishonest. In Feldman’s
verifiable secret sharing scheme, additional public information
(related to the master secret) is made available to every user
which allows them to verify whether the disclosed shares are
correct. Luo et al. [7], [8] incorporated this extension into
their FD-TTP-based key management scheme to make it more
robust against malicious adversaries. However, Saxena [4]
proposed an alternative interpretation of the verifiable secret
sharing scheme entirely.
Saxena [4] proposed a threshold-tolerant identity-based
cryptosystem which is particularly suitable for ad hoc net-
works. He proposed that the secret shares should be used
directly as private keys and that the associated public shares
would be used as public keys. The secret shares are therefore
no longer used as a tool to create additional keying material,
reducing the memory storage overhead and computational
overhead. Also, users can compute the public key of other
network users from their identities and the publicly available
information (also called commitment values or witness values,
depending on the literature) in a non-interactive manner, min-
imizing the communication overhead. Finally, new users can
join the network using the standard threshold secret sharing
techniques. The design of a FD-TTP-based key management
scheme for beyond 5G mobile small cells which is constructed
from the threshold-tolerant identity-based cryptosystem seems
to have efficiency benefits. However, such a key management
scheme will only be secure as long as a malicious user is
incapable of obtaining a threshold amount of private keys
during the entire lifetime of the network [14], [15].
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Network Model
The incorporation of mobile small cells into the network
infrastructure can provide major benefits. The mobile small
cells, making use of D2D communications, are particularly
suitable in the urban environment as the high density of
mobile devices translates to many data requests but also
provides many pathways between arbitrary users. This net-
work infrastructure is capable of increasing data rates and
energy efficiency while reducing latency and interference.
However, many of these advantages should be credited to
ordinary small cells. The strength of a radio signal diminishes
with the square of the distance, therefore replacing the large
transmissions to and from the base station (BS) by numerous
shorter transmissions provide significant energy savings. The
shorter and less power signals will also reduce interference
and allows for increased data rates. Latency is reduced by
providing a more direct route between a source node (SN)
and a destination node (DN). Nevertheless, mobile small
cells provide additional benefits. They can be set up on-
the-fly, based on demand, at any place, at any time, using
existing mobile devices. This wireless ad hoc network can
therefore function at a low cost since network operators
are not required to install and maintain additional network
infrastructure. Furthermore, mobile small cells support time
and space varying traffic [16].
The H2020-MSCA project “SECRET” [2] introduced this
scenario architecture for the next generation cellular network
as it provides opportunities for both network operators and
network users. This scenario architecture is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Fig. 1. The scenario architecture as introduced by project ”SECRET” [3].
The cellular network, consisting of macro cells, is parti-
tioned into a network of mobile small cells. Each mobile
small cell is controlled and maintained by a hotspot. This
is a mobile device that is selected to become the local radio
manager. In addition, each hotspot is controlled by a central-
ized software-defined controller. Through cooperation, these
hotspots form a wireless network that has several gateways to
the mobile network using intelligent high-speed connections.
Data traffic between the mobile devices is established through
D2D communications and the use of relay nodes (RNs). Use
cases include (i) a group of friends playing a multiplayer
game on their devices and (ii) the exchange of multimedia (i.e.
pictures and videos) between devices. Using multi-hop D2D
communications, data can be exchanged between a source
node (SN) and a destination node (DN).
B. Adversarial Model
To provide security in a network of mobile small cells, we
require an efficient and secure key management scheme which
is able to function without requiring access to a centralized
TTP. The utilization of threshold secret sharing to create
a distributed TTP causes the key management scheme to
be susceptible against the following secret sharing-related
attacks.
• Mobile Adversary: A mobile adversary [14] dynamically
moves through the network and compromises devices,
one at a time, with the goal to collect a threshold amount
of unique secret shares. A successful attack enables the
adversary to reconstruct the master key and use it to com-
pute the private keys of other users, eavesdrop on their
private conversations, or launch identity impersonation
attacks.
• Sybil Attack: In the Sybil attack [15], an adversary creates
a large amount of unique identities and wishes to join the
network with each one in order to be provided with a
large set of secret shares. Collecting a threshold amount
of secret shares enables the adversary to reconstruct the
master key and use it to compute the private keys of
other users, eavesdrop on their private conversations, or
launch identity impersonation attacks.
C. Feldman’s Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS)
In Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing scheme [13], a net-
work administrator initializes a network of n users. The
network administrator chooses two large primes p and q, such
that q is a factor of p − 1. The network administrator then
chooses a generator g of cyclic subgroup G ⊂ Z∗p which has
order q. All these values are then made public. The network
administrator selects a security parameter t and a random
polynomial f(x) of degree t− 1 with coefficients ai ∈ Z∗q :
f(x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + · · ·+ at−1xt−1 (1)
Based on the polynomial coefficients, the network adminis-
trator computes the commitment values as:
ci ≡ gai (mod p) | 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1 (2)
For every participating user j in the network, the network
administrator provides a network identifier IDj and secret
share sj :
sj ≡ f(IDj) (mod q) (3)
The user j can use the public commitment values ci to verify








D. The Threshold-Tolerant Identity-based Cryptosystem
The verifiable secret sharing scheme by Feldman [13]
can be translated into an identity-based cryptosystem. The
distributed secret shares sj would instead be used as private
keys skj , the corresponding public shares then become public
keys pkj , and the commitment values ci and the users’
personal identifiers IDj are publicly available information.
This allows any user to non-interactively compute the public
key of any other user (using equation 4). Saxena [4] proposed
a threshold-tolerant identity-based cryptosystem for ad hoc
networks which is based on this translation. The structure
of key generation in the threshold-tolerant identity-based
cryptosystem is illustrated in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Key generation in the threshold-tolerant identity-based cryptosystem.
Additionally, Saxena proposed three cryptographic proce-
dures and named these the secret sharing-based pairwise key
establishment procedure, the secret sharing-based signature
procedure and the secret sharing-based encryption procedure.
Each of these procedures rely on the discrete logarithm prob-
lem for security. To be exact, the pairwise key establishment
procedure is based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
technique, the signature procedure is based on Schnorr’s
signature scheme and the encryption procedure is based on
ElGamal encryption.
IV. OUR PROPOSALS
In this section, we introduce two techniques to design
a secure key management scheme for beyond 5G mobile
small cells based on the threshold-tolerant identity-based
cryptosystem.
A. Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS)
The popular method to prevent a mobile adversary from
collecting a threshold number of shares over an extended
period of time is by incorporating proactive secret sharing
[5], [6]. In proactive secret sharing, the secret shares of every
network user is periodically updated such that their updated
shares are independent from the previous shares. A mobile
adversary which managed to collect a number of shares below
the threshold is unable to combine these with updated shares
to reconstruct the master secret and break the security of the
entire system (i.e. compute every user’s private key). The
mobile adversary therefore has to start over from scratch.
It is important to mention that the original description of
proactive secret sharing wishes to update the shares while
keeping the master secret the same. Keeping the master secret
unchanged is an important requirement in other FD-TTP-
based key management schemes since they are required to
reconstruct the master secret to perform some kind of key
management operation (e.g. signing a certificate). However,
a key management scheme that is based on the threshold-
tolerant identity-based cryptosystem does not require honest
users to reconstruct the master secret and could therefore
allow the master secret to change as well. A successful mobile
adversary attack in other FD-TTP-based key management
schemes therefore leads to a compromised network for its
entire lifetime, whereas the threshold-tolerant identity-based
cryptosystem key management scheme will only be com-
promised during that particular period in between updating
phases. This additional layer of security may allow updating
phases to be less frequent, leading to a futher reduction of the
communication overhead compared to other FD-TTP-based
key management schemes.
Proactive secret sharing effectively updates every user’s
private key, its corresponding public key and the public
commitment values. This key updating procedure is equivalent
to the two updating procedures which are necessary in the
other FD-TTP-based key management schemes (e.g., the
key updating procedure and the share updating procedure).
Furthermore, periodic key updating also provides benefits in
terms of key revocation. By limiting the amount of time
between key compromise and key expiration (through updat-
ing), key revocation may become redundant [17], [18]. These
consequences allow for a more elegant and simplistic key
management design.
However, proactive secret sharing is solely designed to
prevent a mobile adversary attack and is incapable of prevent-
ing the Sybil attack. To prevent the Sybil attack, admission
control would have to be organized in cooperation with
the existing network infrastructure. Network operators have
access to identifying information of their subscribers and thus
have the ability to consider and authorize whether or not a
user may participate and communicate through the network of
mobile small cells. The network operators could provide their
subscribers with some kind of token, acting as an indicator
for network users that a requesting user can be safely added
to the network.
B. Private Key Cloaking
An alternative solution would be to cloak the value of the
private key by combining it with an additional public-private
key pair. We name this technique “private key cloaking”
and is similar to key generation in certificateless public key
cryptography [19]. In certificateless public key cryptography,
every user obtains a partial private key (the private key which
corresponds to the user’s identity) from the TTP and generates
an additional partial key pair. Both partial private keys are
combined into the user’s private key while the public keys
remain separated. The public key which corresponds to the
user’s identity can be estimated from publicly available infor-
mation, whereas the additional public key has to be exchanged
between users. The additional public key does not need to
be certified, since a malicious adversary is unable to benefit
from launching a key replacement attack (i.e. the malicious
adversary does not have access to the partial private key
corresponding to the user’s identity). Key generation is similar
in our proposal, except that we replace the identity-based
public-private key pair for the secret sharing-based public-
private key pair. The key generation structure is illustrated in
Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Key generation with private key cloaking.
This key generation structure effectively cloaks the value of
the secret share, preventing a mobile adversary from collecting
a threshold amount of secret shares (or even a single one).
An additional advantage to this solution is that the threshold
t could be set to a reasonably low value. This means that
users do not need to store as many public commitment values
in the memory of their devices and thus reduces the memory
storage overhead.
The reduced threshold also affects the user admittance
process. New users can be admitted to the network by sending
a request to a threshold number of network users for its
private key. These network users would securely provide the
joining user with a share of its private key (i.e. its cloaked
secret share) and the joining user would combine these to
establish its own private key. The reduced threshold means
that it becomes easier for a new user to join the network
since it is more likely that it has a threshold amount of
network users within its transmission range. Furthermore, the
communication overhead is reduced as fewer transmissions
are required. A Sybil attack is also prevented with this
technique since new users (or the same user with multiple
identities) are unable to compute their secret sharing-based
private key from the obtained private key.
However, there is also a downside to the private key
cloaking technique. As is also the case in certificateless
public key cryptography, only one of the two public keys
can be computed non-interactively from the publicly available
information (i.e. the user’s identity and the commitment
values). The additional public key must still be transmitted
through the network before two users can establish a secure
channel. Similarly, this additional public key does not need
to be certified as a malicious attacker would not benefit from
launching a man-in-the-middle attack.
V. FUTURE WORK
In our future work, we will design a key management
scheme for each proposed extension. This key management
scheme is expected to include: (i) a network initialization
phase with a master key creation and private key distribution
protocol, and (ii) a network operational phase with a pairwise
key establishment protocol, a key updating protocol and a
threshold key distribution protocol to support joining users.
These key management schemes will be evaluated and com-
pared with related FD-TTP-based key management schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied whether we can design an efficient
and secure fully distributed key management scheme based on
the threshold-tolerant identity-based cryptosystem for beyond
5G mobile small cells. To provide security in beyond 5G
mobile small cells, we require resistance against mobile
adversary and Sybil attacks. We proposed the incorporation
of proactive secret sharing and found that such a key man-
agement scheme can reach a higher level of security, have a
reduced overhead and will be more simplistic compared to
related FD-TTP-based key management schemes. However,
this extension is incapable of providing resistance against a
Sybil attack. We also proposed the incorporation of private key
cloaking and found that such a key management scheme can
effectively prevent both the mobile adversary and the Sybil
attack at the cost of an increased communication overhead.
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